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Abstract 
Risk is in involved in all activities especially in oil and gas industries. It is involved from the day 
one the project has started. Risk during the exploration phase, the chance that you found only dry 
wells the company may lose a fortune or risk during planning and design phase, the wrong 
design has been selected the project will face problems and gradually with maturity of the 
project. 
This paper will talk about risk with focusing during planning and design phase in oil and gas 
industries. Get to know and understand analysis methods will assist in choosing a right 
method(s) for the job. A combination set of analysis methods will fulfill the objective of analyst 
process. A study case of three phase separator will be used throughout the paper. 
In chapter 3 Analytical methods, three well known and most use methods – Failure Mode Effect 
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Hazard and Operability Study 
(HAZOP) – will be present in this paper with pros and cons, strengths and weaknesses with 
suggestions for improvement, what the result of the analysis are, how it can assist you in decision 
making process and help in select right method according to the purpose of your analysis. 
Uncertainty is an important factor that we must consider during perform an analysis. Therefore 
chapter 4 Dealing with uncertainties will discuss about two methods – Bayesians Network and 
Sensitivity Analysis - that analyse should perform in order to reduce any uncertainty that 
involved in the primary analyst. The final risk analysis result from chapter 3 will be analysis 
once again with Bayesians Network and Sensitivity Analysis in order to reduce the uncertainties 
that may involve.  
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1. Introduction 
Every action, every activity and every business is inherited risk. Risk cannot be eliminated but 
can always reduce and prevent. 
We may classify risk into two big categories. First economic risk which included all risk related 
with cost. Reliability is strongly related with economic risk due to variance in availability of the 
system and/or component reflex the revenue and cost during the down-time of the system. 
Therefore decision that been made during conceptual and design phase is also give a big impact 
to the whole project. We may select the cheapest equipment that available in the market, but 
most of this case will end up with higher maintenance cost and followed with less system 
availability. Second safety risk which included all risk related with health and safety of people 
and environment. Safety analysis must be conducted in order to avoid and prevent incident. 
There are numbers of methods to analyse risk and they has different weaknesses and strengths. 
Risk cannot be analyzed by a single method. A combination of methods is a must to ensure that 
all the possible risk has been consider and minimized below the risk acceptance criteria. 
How to ensure that the method(s) we select are best choice and for the correct purpose? What are 
the advantages and disadvantages of each method? What is the information you will get from the 
analysis? In what aspect those analysis results will do to the project? We can answer these 
questions once we know the method well, and select the right one based on the objective of 
analyse process. 
The traditional risk analysis based on traditional probability and calculated from P(A|K) – the 
probability of event A occurs given K as background knowledge or background information – 
without consider the uncertainty in those background information. Many of the accident in the 
past occurred because the uncertainties in background information has not ignored, undiscovered 
and not well managed.  
Analyse can choose to analyst risk with traditional approach and try to reduce uncertainty of the 
final analysis’ result or to adapt new theory to reduce the uncertainties during analysis process.  
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2. Definition and abbreviation 
2.1   Definition 
Availability   The probability that a system is not failed or undergoing a repair  
    action when it needs to be used
[1]
 
Down time   The amount of time a repairable unit is not operation. This can be  
    due to being in a failed state, administrative delay, waiting for  
    replacement parts to be shipped or undergoing active repair
[1]
 
Failure   The termination of the ability of an item to perform a required  
    function
[2]
 
NOTE - After failure the item has a fault. “Failure” is an event, as distinguished from a “fault”, which is a state 
(prEN 13306) 
Failure mechanism  Physical, chemical or other processes which lead or have led to  
    failure (prEN 13306)
[2]
 
Failure rate   Number of failures of an item in a given time interval divided by  
    the time interval (prEN 13306)
[2]
 
NOTE 1 - This value is an approximation. 
NOTE 2 - In some cases time can be replaced by units of use.(In most cases 1/MTTF can be used as the predictor for the failure 
rate, i.e. the average number of failures per unit of time in the long run if the units are replaced by an identical unit at failure. 
Failure rate can be based on operational or calendar time.) 
 
Failure mode   The observed manner of failure (ISO 14224)
[2] 
Inspection   Activity carried out periodically and used to assess the progress of  
    damage in a component
[2]
 
NOTE 1 - Inspection can be by means of technical instruments (e.g. NDT) or as visual examination. 
NOTE 2 - prEN 13306 has been deviated from in order to apply to the most common use of the term “inspection” in the oil and 
gas industry, which relates inspection and inspection management to the activity of checking the conformity of the equipment by 
NDT instruments or visual examination at regular intervals. 
 
Maintenance   Combination of all technical, administrative and managerial  
    actions, including supervision actions, during the life cycle of an  
    item intended to retain it in, or restore it to, a state in which it can  
    perform the required function (prEN 13306)
[2] 
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Reliability   The probability of components, parts and systems to perform their  
    required functions for a desired period of time without failure in  
    specified environments with a desired confidence
[1] 
Probability   A quantitative description of the possible likelihood of a particular  
    event. Probability is conventionally expressed on a scale from 0 to  
    1, or 0% to 100%, with an unlikely event having a probability  
    close to 0, and very common event having a probability close to  
    1
[1]
 
Up time   The amount of time a repairable unit is operating per design
[1]
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2.2 Abbreviation 
CAPEX Capital Expenditure 
FMECA Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis 
FTA  Fault Tree Analysis 
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study 
MDT  Mean Maintenance Down Time 
MTBF  Mean Time between Failures 
MTTF  Mean Time to Failure 
MTTR Mean Time to Repair 
OPEX  Operational Expenditure 
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3. Analytical methods 
There are many methods or model that can be use to conduct risk analysis. Each method has its 
own strengths and weaknesses. Analyst should be able to select the most-fit method with regard 
to the aim and purpose of the analysis and tailored made to the analysis objective, operational 
phase of the selected infrastructure. 
Even thought different method has been rise, but the main purpose of conducting risk analysis is 
to give decision-making support in both selecting of solutions and measures.  
Risk can be described by (A, C, U, P, K), when A is equal to events, C equal consequences or 
outcome of an event A, U equal uncertainty in associated with both A and C, P is the probability 
the events A and consequences C and given the knowledge or background knowledge as K.
[3]
 
Further in this chapter we will describe how the methods link to risk that described with (A, C, 
U, P, K) especially uncertainty in risk analysis. 
3.1 Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis 
Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis method is a systematic analysis method which 
developed by the U.S. Military. The first guideline was Military Procedure MIL-P-1692 dated 
November 9, 1949
[4]
. It’s often called FMECA or FMEA. The different between FMECA and 
FMEA is in FMECA has added detail regarding criticality or severity of the failure which is an 
important factor to create “Risk Matrix” for future use. 
“FMECA is quantitative method of reliability analysis which 
involves a fault modes and effects analysis together with a 
consideration of the probability of failure modes, their consequence 
and ranking of effects and the seriousness of the faults (BS 3811)” 
FMECA explore and identifies the effects, probability, failure rate, criticality, consequences, 
how to avoid, how to detect and how to mitigate the effects of the failure or malfunctions of each 
individual components in an observed sub-system in detail level. It is widely conducted during 
conceptual and design phase since it gives information such as probability, failure rate (the 
numbers can be found from many source such as knowledge-base (K), historical date or OREDA 
– Offshore Reliability Database) and effect of the failure (how badly it effect to the sub-system 
and to the whole system) which can assist us pre-select the best alternative or revise design if 
needed (see Figure 1). 
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By conducting FMECA we can ensure that all potential failure has been considered and proper 
actions have been made to eliminate these known potential failures before they occur. 
The boundary of the system or subsystem must be verified so that you will only consider 
components in the system without consider any effect it might have from external source. This is 
one of the weaknesses of FMECA method which we will discuss later in this chapter. 
3.1.1 FMECA with project life cycle 
FMECA in conceptual and design phase 
In the early phase as conceptual and design phase gives the most impact on equipment reliability. 
As the design matures, it becomes more difficult to alter. Unfortunately, the time, cost, and 
resources required to correct a problem increase as well.
[5]
 
By consider component in sub-system and with all information you have after performed 
FMECA, we can compare all options we have and select the best choice. The question is “what 
factors determine the best?”, “Shall we select from the cheapest provider?”, “Shall we select the 
alternative that most reliable?”, “Shall we select the option with the cheapest maintenance 
cost?”, “Shall we select the option which gives lowest criticality?” Those are the questions we all 
face when it comes to decision making. 
 
FIGURE 1 FMECA IN DESIGN PHASE
[4] 
 
With my own opinion quality always come with the price. Means if you want a good piece of 
equipment or part you would have to pay more. The figure below (see Figure 2) illustrates a draft 
example the relation between CAPEX and OPEX with regard to reliability of the system and it 
proves my simple opinion.  
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There are two options that the team needs to select. Option A’s CAPEX is lower than option B. 
In option B the company must invest more in project startup (CAPEX) such as equipment cost, 
installing, construction but supplier will benefit more from this different. 
Let’s look at the overall project cost, option A’s overall project cost is higher than option B. The 
OPEX cost is the cost during operation such as maintenance, repair, inspection routine and 
including the lost of profit during shutdown (if any in case of downtime). The different is the 
company’s benefit since the more reliability the equipment is the less downtime and more 
availability we will get. 
We can see that by selecting the more reliable equipment is a win-win situation to both party 
(supplier and the company). Supplier increasing benefit by provide higher reliability products to 
customer, definitely the company will have to pay more for those products. Company increasing 
benefit in total project cost because the high reliability products give higher availability in 
production phase and lower maintenance cost. 
 
FIGURE 2 SELECTING OPTIONS 
NB! Blue line, green line and red line represent CAPEX, OPEX and Overall project cost 
respectively.  
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FMECA in production phase 
Information such as MTTF, MTBF, MTTR, and MDT can be included in FMECA report for 
future use during production phase. It gives overview of all components for example expected 
failure date, life time of the component, and required time during maintenance. 
To plan maintenance schedule gives many advantage during production phase. Here are some 
examples: 
 Allow changing of the component before the component failure (referred from MTTF). 
Must take extra closer look at critical component 
 Allow inspection of the component before it worn out and lead to component failure 
(referred from MTTF) 
 Allow maintenance routine to schedule during planned temporary shutdown 
 Increase availability – no downtime = higher availability 
 Increase reliability – routine inspection to ensure that component is in good condition 
 Allow routine maintenance to extend component’s life time 
For extended use of FMECA, we can link information from FMECA to internal database which I 
will give example later in this chapter. 
3.1.2  FMECA process 
Since FMECA will be conducted to one sub-system at the time, we need to verify which sub-
system we will start to observe. Verify the boundary of the observed system. Gather the team to 
conduct FMECA. The team should consist of expert from different expertise area to ensure that 
different point of view will be given during the analysis process. The following step shall be 
performed: 
1. Define an observe system boundaries – identify which part is to be included which part is 
not 
2. Define expected performance or the expected function of the system – since failure of a 
component is including when the component not in fully function or degrade operation. 
For example the valve should seal a pipe 100%, if there is some leakage that’s mean the 
valve is fail to function as it should 
3. Define operational and environmental condition – operational and environmental 
condition can be storage capacity, at specific pressure and temperature, and weather. 
Those gives effect to the system and should take into account that FMECA is performed 
under these constrains and what are the consequences when we brake those constrains 
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4. Prepare FMECA worksheet – FMECA can be categorized into 3 main type[4] 
a. Design FMECA is carried out to eliminate failure during equipment design, 
taking into account all type of failures 
b. Process FMECA is focused on problems stemming from how the equipment is 
manufactured, maintained or operated 
c. System FMECA looks for potential problems and bottlenecks in larger processes, 
such as entire production line 
 
Different type of FMECA requires or prefers different information. Therefore there is no 
concrete FMECA worksheet, it is depend on which information fit and can assists 
decision making.  
 
Design FMECA may need information such as criticality, failure rate, consequences of 
the failure that assist design and concept selection 
Process FMECA may need information such as MTTF, MTBF that use in maintenance 
planning program 
System FMECA may need information such as potential failure mode, potential effect 
on the system in global. 
 
We shall keep in mind that we should keep it simple, add only useful information else the 
worksheet will look too complex and difficult to understand 
 
5. Collect and list all the equipments and parts – this information can gather from many 
sources such as design’s drawing and specification. It is important to ensure that all the 
parts in the system is listed 
6. Collect information from previous or similar designs from internal and external source – 
information such as possible cause of each failure mode, consequences, probability, and 
how to detect the failure 
7. Prioritize criticality – prioritize and identify criticality of each failure mode and propose 
risk reducing measure by start from the highest risk item first 
8. Agree and suggest actions – The team agrees and suggests proper actions to mitigate the 
risk and proper actions in case of failure occur. 
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3.1.3 Pros and cons 
Pros Cons 
 
 Allow feasibility study of development options[6] 
 Design  optimization 
 Improve reliability 
 Understanding the causes of failure that lead to 
the highest risks 
 Understanding the failure mechanisms 
 Identifying and prioritizing mitigating measure 
(spot the most important aspects and focus for 
revision to minimize those risk first) 
 Focusing and effective test procedures (useful 
input for validate testing, validate each 
component whether it’s in functional mode) 
 Learning about failures without experiencing 
them 
 Higher reliability in service 
 Shorter development times[6] 
 Reduction in CAPEX and OPEX[6] 
 Help in decision making, pre-selection process 
 Provide basic maintenance planning[7] 
 Criticality category can be categorized based on 
many different perspectives. From operation 
perspective, the most critical is when production 
shut-down. From HSE perspective, the most 
critical can vary from large pollution to fatality 
(see Table 1 and Table 2)  
 
 
 Does not consider effect(s) from 
external source 
 Easy to forget failure which cause 
from human error
[8]
 
 The worksheet can be too complex or 
complicate when numbers of 
information added 
 Time consuming[8] 
 
SPE-96335
[9]
 has described benefits of using FMECA in a new technology application, such as: 
 Better understanding of the key reliability issues to put the operator in a stronger position 
to make well informed decisions about the best applications for this technology 
 The focus to ensure that action plans and resources are targeted where they will provide 
most benefit on preventing or mitigating the critical failure modes 
 A baseline for comparisons with other technology options 
 A framework which can be used for future FMECA’s 
“A baseline for comparisons with other technology options” benefit from the paper is conformed 
to “help in decision making and pre-selection process” that listed in the table above. Analyst 
perform FMECA of all alternatives have, compare, use the analyzed data assist in decision 
making process and select the best alternative. The analysis can be performed before the 
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application is constructed. Therefore, by conduct FMECA we can surely achieve many indirect 
result of the analysis such as cost saving, time saving, system’s deep information are recorded 
for further use and may use as template for a similar application or project in the future. 
The paper also put a strong focus only on the critical aspect of the analysis, focus in mitigating 
them. However there are no concrete set of rule or concrete category for criticality or severity. 
 
Example of severity from SEMATECH 1992 standard 
TABLE 1 SEMATECH SEVERITY RANKING CRITERIA[5] 
Rank Description 
1–2  
 
Failure is of such minor nature that the customer (internal or external) will 
probably not detect the failure. 
3–5 
 
Failure will result in slight customer annoyance and/or slight deterioration of part 
or system performance. 
6–7 
 
Failure will result in customer dissatisfaction and annoyance and/or deterioration 
of part or system performance. 
8–9 
 
Failure will result in high degree of customer dissatisfaction and cause non-
functionality of system. 
10 
 
Failure will result in major customer dissatisfaction and cause non-system 
operation or non-compliance with government regulations. 
 
Other example is from The Institution of Engineering and Technology 
TABLE 2 IET SEVERITY RANKING CRITERIA[10] 
Catagory Degree Description 
I Minor Functional failure of part of machine or process - no potential 
for injury 
II Critical Failure will probably occur without major damage to system or 
serious injury 
III Major Major damage to system and/or potential serious injury to 
personnel 
IV Catastrophic Failure causes complete system loss and/or potential for fatal 
injury 
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We can see that from two different sources they already have strong contrast in categorizing 
severity. One is focused and ranked based on the design concept, customer satisfaction and 
government regulations, while another one is focused and ranked based on a level of failure and 
it consequences. 
3.1.4 Weaknesses and strengths 
Weaknesses 
One sub-system at the time – FMECA is performed on one sub-system at the time which makes 
it impossible to look at the system in the big picture. Additionally, it is difficult to read and to 
spot the most fragile or most critical component in the object sub-system especially if the system 
composed of numbers of small components. 
Complex report – Since FMECA report doesn’t have a concrete format, analyst can always 
choose to add one or more columns that he or she thinks that information can be useful and/or 
can assist decision making. For example analyst may add MTTF and MTBF for maintenance 
purpose but that information won’t be necessary or useful during normal production phase. The 
problem is the more information you added, the more complex the report is. Best thing to do is to 
keep it simple and insert only important information that needed according to the project or to 
the level of the reader. 
Time consume – To perform a good FMECA is a time consuming process, since each 
component must be consider with regard to the effect to (local) sub-system and the effect to 
(global) whole system. Information must be collected from many sources. For example failure 
rate can be found from OREDA, but failure cause or failure mechanism can be gathered from 
historical date or knowledge-base. An expert analyse can reduce analysis time tremendously by 
using his/her experience on components, using information from a similar project or analysis 
Expensive – Once the observe system has been modified you will need to conduct FMECA all 
over again. Since the new component effect the whole observed system. Therefore FMECA need 
to performed in every changed we made during the design phase (see Figure 1) 
Not for multi-problem – FMECA is conducted by looking at the failure which occurs on a 
single component while other components are in function. But in real practice failure can cause 
on more than one component at the time.  
Overlook human factor – In many cases analyst tended to focus on mechanism or technical 
issue of the component and overlook at error that can cause from human error. Some of the 
system may need human assistance or to activate the system, but since those are external source 
that we didn’t consider as a part of the observed system. The failure which cause from human 
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will be overlooked (see Weaknesses of FTA for more detail in how to reduce, prevent and avoid 
human error) 
Uncertainties – It is in the nature of all predicted data, estimated data or even measured data 
always has uncertainty. Unfortunately uncertainty cannot be eliminated, but reduced.  
As mention earlier that risk and uncertain are in every activities, same as the activity we perform 
during data gathering process. We cannot be 100% sure that the database or data we selected and 
used in analysis has no error or it is the database with 100% certain information. Every data on 
FMECA worksheet or report are uncertain due to it is a probability value that get from four 
different approaches
[11]
: 
 Direct use of historical data 
 Direct assignment or estimates 
 Use of standard probability distribution 
 Use of detailed modeling of phenomena and processes – fault tree (see 3.2 Fault Tree 
Analysis), Bayesian believe network (see 4.1 Bayesian networks) etc. 
The failure rate is the data that often get from historical data by repeating the same experimental 
on the same component under the same condition over and over again, so called “Frequentist 
Probability”. The uncertainty we found in this kind of probability is the error when repeating the 
experiment. Since it is likely impossible to set up exactly the same experiment over and over 
again. How large the number of experiment should be? How can we ensure that the experiment 
has been set up correctly under the designed or specific condition? There might be some error on 
measuring equipment, while the data is recorded, while the data is transfer from one to another, 
and during interpret of the data itself. Those are some source of uncertainty of measured data and 
are ignored in classical probability theory. Therefore, analyse should select and perform the same 
analysis with different database to double check or cross checking for the final result. 
Another approach is probability that obtain by using background knowledge of experts or K in 
Risk description that mention earlier in Chapter 3 Analytical methods. This type of probability 
called Subjective Probability (will be discuss later on in 4.1 Bayesian networks). Uncertainty that 
involved in this type of probability is the estimate or the knowledge that come from experts. 
When we using such probability, we must consider uncertainties such as: 
 How trust worthy the source of information – who are those experts, ones can called 
oneself an expert but maybe one doesn’t. A common sense may be used. For example in 
a dice game, everyone knows that a dice has 6 alternatives. If the game offer high prize 
and high chance that you will win the game, we may use our common sense that the host 
may cheat or trick us somehow and we give our own estimate for the chance that we will 
win the game. In this case, we are the expert who gives out the information, but how trust 
worthy it will be this also related with risk attitude.  
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Another case is to select a source of information using as knowledge base information. 
An expert in electrical instrument couldn’t give good information when it comes to 
knowledge of chemistry. It is uncertain that the source of information we selected is the 
best for the job. 
 How accurate the source of information  
 Does the source of information excepted worldwide or only apply for a particular area – 
in many situations the probability of a particular event to occur is vary from place to 
place. The probability that a boat will sink is vary tremendously from a calm lake to a 
rough sea. 
Therefore it is also important that we consider these constrains and limits while we consider for a 
source of our knowledge base information, to reduce the uncertainties as low as possible.  
What about the predicted data and estimate data? Those data is a result from estimate procedure, 
equation, average or mean value of history data. 
  
 
FIGURE 3 UNCERTAINTIES IN MEAN VALUE [12] 
An example of uncertainty can be described from figure above (see Figure 3). Given that you 
have a set of measured MTTF data, you enter the data and calculate for mean value. Most of the 
data is covered under normal distribution, but there are a few data that plotted outside normal 
distribution. For example, assumed that a mean failure rate of a component in a particular failure 
mode - calculated from up and running 100 pieces of the same component and record the time 
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when it fail – is equal to 11.2 times per 106 working hours, and lower and upper failure rate with 
90% confident interval are [2.82, 16.38], which mean there is 10% chance that the component 
will fail before or after 90% confident interval.  Shall we overlook at those rare data? 
We can play safe by design for an application or solution that reduce risk according to ALARP 
concept – As Low as Reasonably Practicable – which mean we need to consider the amount of 
money we need to invest in order to reduce the risk in our question.  
Require inside knowledge from many expertise area – We may need to gather experts from 
difference area to ensure that all aspect and possibility is covered and considered from those who 
has the inside knowledge. This is cost a fortune in resources using in order to conduct an 
FMECA report of the observed system. 
Difficult to identify the level/how large/how deep the system should be – Large system make 
more complicate to analyse, but on the other hand small system may too small and not useful for 
any future use. 
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Strength 
Make complex system easier – The unique technique for FMECA gives an advantage for a 
large complex system due to FMECA need to be conducted from each sub-system. In that case 
you can combine FMECA report and perform root cause analysis or to investigate from the 
failure component.  Additionally, by splitting system into small sub-system make it much easier 
to evaluate. 
Great source for supplier selection – There are hundreds of supplier for every piece of 
equipment. When it comes to the decision which one we should go for, we may use information 
that listed and studied from FMECA report. Information such as how often it can fail, how long 
the component last and cost can assist us through selection process. 
Assist in design selection – After the team has complete FMECA of the system, options will be 
considered and select the best base on information that given on FMECA report (see Figure 1) 
Gives recommended action – When an actual component is fail, the recommended actions that 
listed in FMECA report should be called and used properly. To avoid any further failure or effect 
to another system that can create a larger problem. 
Clear document information – Give clear information such as how to detect the failure, what to 
do when the failure occurred, what are the consequences. 
Cost saving – The earlier you conduct FMECA, the more you save in CAPEX. Once you re-
design something after the system has been build, that means the project need to fall back to the 
re-purchase, re-build and in worst case it will cost delayed the delivery. From the face that every 
project matures along with the time, therefore, the earlier you notice that re-design is needed, the 
more cost, time and resources saving you can make. 
Assist in maintenance planning program – Knowing failure rate, MTTF and MTBF could 
assist you in planning a maintenance program 
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TABLE 3 EXAMPLE OF AN FMECA REPORT 
 
FMECA of separator 
System: Separator      Performed by: 
Subsystem:        Date: 
Function: Three-phases separator    Page: 
  
Description of Unit Desciption of failure Effect of failure 
Failure 
Rate 
(per 
million 
hrs) 
Criticality 
Corrective action/ 
Risk reducing 
measure 
Remark 
Ref. 
No. 
Function 
Operational 
Mode 
Failure 
mode 
Failure 
mechanism 
Detection 
of failure 
On the 
subsystem 
On the system 
function 
CV3 
Separated 
water 
flow 
control 
Open 
Does not 
open on 
demand 
- Not fully open 
- Internal failure 
(wear) 
- Receiver failure 
- Debris inside 
valve 
- Increasing fluid 
level inside 
separator 
- Level transmitter 
warning system 
- Pressure 
decrease 
- More oil in WTS 
- Close CV1 - Overfilling 
separator 
- Contamination 
on SI 
   tank 1.62 Critical 
- Redundant system 
   for inlet 
- Routine inspection 
- Scheduled cleaning 
   hydraulic line 
(avoid 
   blockage)   
Open 
when it 
is not 
intended 
- Internal failure 
(wear) 
- Wrong signal 
  - None - High 
hydrocarbon 
    concentration 
in WTS 
0.73 Critical 
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3.1.5 Suggestion 
For future extended use of FMECA, we can link FMECA with internal database such as supplier 
contact number, price of equipment (when it been purchased and current price), spare part of 
equipment (if any), how it manufactured, maintenance schedule to create a great information 
source. 
Below is some examples use of such information: 
 Fast and easy to find supplier contact information when we needed their assistant 
 Fast and easy to evaluate, compare and select supplier when new component is needed 
 Overview of spare part inventory 
 Fast and easy way to access component’s detail internally (how it manufacture, drawing, 
spec etc.) 
 Assist in creating maintenance schedule, help in track and log information 
 Possible to search and reuse data from similar project 
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3.2 Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis is a Top-down analysis approach that was developed in 1962 under U.S. Air 
Force Ballistics Systems Division at Bell Laboratories. The analyse method is to model and 
analyze failure processes of engineering – component failure, construction failure – and 
environment that relevant. 
We started and focus on “Undesired event” – top event - and analyse the way down to what can 
cause or trigger the undesired event. All possible failure will be listed as event. This is one of 
many advantage of FTA since we can consider multiple events (event that can cause the 
undesired event). 
In compare with FMECA, FTA is way faster and best-fit for trouble shooting, root cause analysis 
since it focus on what can contribute the undesired event without regard to all other possible 
failure that can lead to other event, and suitable for a complex system. This is an advantage of 
using fault tree to analysis a large and complex system because we do not need to analyse the 
whole system at once. 
Additionally it is possible to include human error in contribution to component error that can 
trigger the undesired event to occur, but can only include only in qualitative analysis. The reason 
will be discuss later in this chapter under 3.2.2 Quantitative FTA. 
In fault tree all events linked together with different gates. Two main and most important gates 
are “AND” gate and “OR” gate.  
AND gate – the top event (output) will occur, 
when all bottom events (input) occurred simultaneously. 
 
 
 
 
OR gate – the top event (output) will occur, 
when one or more bottom event(s) (input) occurred. 
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Events are described in rectangular shape. It is wise to name event with detail information rather 
than “fail”. Such as “valve fail”, we may describe as “valve fail to open on demand” 
FTA can be done in both quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis. Probability of occurrence 
may be added within the event symbol for quantitative analysis. For further discussion under 
quantitative analysis see 3.2.2. 
Separator 
Overfilled
Excessive gas 
inside separator
Excessive liquid 
inside separator
Failure in relieft 
system
Fault signal from 
PC keep PV close
CV2 fail to open 
on demand
1 2
Excessive water 
inside separator
Excessive oil 
inside separator
CV3 fail to open 
on demand
CV4 fail to open 
on demand
LV fail to open on 
demand
Fault signal keep 
LV close
3 4 5 6
 
FIGURE 4 EXAMPLE OF FTA DIAGRAM 
3.2.1 Qualitative FTA 
Once we performed a qualitative FTA, we will get a full overview of events that caused the 
undesired event to occur. We may also use FT diagram as a Root Cause Analysis input data or 
transform FTA into Reliability Block diagram in order to easily identify redundancy of the 
system or cut set for further use. 
Boolean value - 0 or 1 – can be assigned to each event as 0 represent system is not in function 
and 1 represent system is in function.  
For “OR” gate of component 1 and component 2 
Component 
1 status 
Component 
2 status 
System status 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
1 0 0 
1 1 1 
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FIGURE 6 CONVERSION OF “OR” GATE (FTA TO RBD) 
 
For “AND” gate of component 1 and component 2 
Component 
1 status 
Component 
2 status 
System status 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
1 0 1 
1 1 1 
 
 
FIGURE 7 "AND" GATE 
 
FIGURE 8 CONVERSION OF “AND” GATE (FTA TO RBD) 
1 
2 
1 2 
2 1 
 
1 2 
FIGURE 5 "OR" GATE 
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For quantitative analysis it is not possible to analyse a degrade system. The system can be in 
either function state or non-function state.  Therefore a system or a component that degraded in 
percentage from the fully function will count as non-function state (can be vary depends on the 
criteria of the designer e.g. a system is in non-function state when component is at 80% 
functional or less). 
Another possibility for degrade system is given degrade system as an undesired event in Fault 
tree. An example is “gas outlet to production facilities is less than 20000 cubic meter per second” 
(when the full capacity is 25000 cubic meter per second). 
From Figure 4, we can see that all events have “OR” relationship to each other. That’s mean if 
one of these event fail, the undesired event will occur. In other word, the system has no 
redundancy.  
3.2.2 Quantitative FTA 
For quantitative FTA, probability value has been added into each basic event and will be used in 
calculation for the final risk associated value. This is technically correct but contains uncertainty 
in the value.  
Failure rate data can be collected from manufacturers’ database, statistic of the component itself 
or from industry failure database.  
Failure rate functions -      - is defined mathematically as: 
         
    
 
  
                
 
Approximation:  
                        
 
Both equation give approximate value which always contain uncertainty in itself. In most case, 
those uncertainties are forgotten or fading its importance during analysis process. Mean value are 
often used in calculation without regard to the uncertainty dimension.  
 “The risk analyses conducted today often have a strong focus 
 on probabilities and expected values. Reflections associated 
 with the uncertainty dimension and manageability are 
lacking”[3] 
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In this paper and the study case that we will discuss later will use knowledge base information 
from OREDA which give information such as mean value of the failure rate per 10
6 
hours, 
confidence interval (lower and upper limit) of the mean value and maximum likelihood of the 
failure rate. 
               
 
In additional MTTF which referred in last chapter can be calculated from: 
      
 
 
 
When 
    
                  
                          
  
 
 
 
 
Example case study from Figure 4, we add failure rate information into fault tree. The case study 
is to analyse a possibility that a separator tank is overfilled during operation period. The “top 
event” or “undesired event” is “Separator Overfilled”. We then brake down to possible events 
until we reach basic event level that can trigger the undesired event to occur. We will get Figure 
9, when red value represent mean failure rate per 10
6
 hours from OREDA and since the failure 
rates from OREDA are constant, therefore we can use exponential distribution represent lifetime 
distribution (most of electronic component have exponential distribution as lifetime distribution). 
The blue values represent probability of component failure after 20 years from: 
 
           
When 
    
 
Assume that all components in the study case are non-repairable units and T is a component 
lifetime, t is the time that we observed.   
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A probability that the component will fail after time t or F(t) from : 
               
 
 
 
              
 
 
   
               
 
 
 
                
              
 
And for survivor function or R(t) (probability that the component is in function after time t) 
from:  
 
               
            
      
 
From the case study “CV3 fails to open on demand” or P4, the failure rate is equal 1.62 per 10
6
 
hours. We then get the probability that “CV3 fails to open on demand” after 20 years (175200 
hours). (In the example I gave P1 is the basic event on left most and P6 is the basic event on the 
right most. See Figure 9) 
 
                           
         
        
 
For a system that all component align in series, probability or reliability that the undesired event 
will occur after one year can be calculate from: 
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For a system that all component align in series, probability or reliability that the undesired event 
will occur after one year can be calculate from: 
     
 
   
 
            
 
   
   
 
   
 
When  g = Unreliability of the system 
 h = Reliability of the system 
 P = Probability that system will function after one year 
 
Therefore the reliability of the system after 20 years is equal 
                       
       = 0.8955 ∙ 0.8437 ∙ 0.7529 ∙ 0.7529 ∙ 0.8647 ∙ 0.8955 
       = 0.3316 
   g = 1 – h 
       = 1- 0.3316 
       = 0.6684 
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However, if we use lower failure rate with 90% interval, the failure rate of P1 and P6 = 0.03, P2 = 
0.004, P3 and P4 = 0.06 and P5 = 0.03 and the probability that components are in function after 20 
years are 0.9948, 0.9993, 0.9895, 0.9895, 0.9945, 0.9948 respectively. Therefore the reliability 
of the separator (that it won’t be overfilled) is equal: 
                                               
            
        
For upper failure rate with 90% interval, the failure rate of P1 and P6 = 3.16, P2 = 3.62, P3 and P4 
= 6.21 and P5 = 3.20 and the probability that components will fail after 20 years are 0.6749, 
0.5304, 0.3369, 0.3369, 0.5708, 0.6749 respectively. Therefore the reliability of the separator at 
year 20
th
 is equal: 
                                               
            
         
This is mean, the range between lower and mean reliability of the undesired event - occur after 
20 years - can be varying between [0.037, 0.6684] and [0.6684, 0.9843] for mean unreliability 
and upper unreliability. It means without maintenance of the separator, there is very high 
probability – 98% - that the separator tank will over-fill at the beginning of year 21st. We can use 
this reliability values to improve or redesign of the system. In this case it can be consider for 
another type of valve that more reliable, or redundancy of the system. 
Additionally, a slightly change or slightly deviated in reliability value on a single component will 
also give a large effect on the final reliability value of the undesired event. 
This is a simple example of the effect of uncertainty in data (described as U in risk description). 
The probability is only the value that analyse get from the history data or background knowledge 
information (described as K in risk description).  
Another down-side of quantitative analysis is that it is nearly impossible to include probability 
value or any estimate for an error which cause by human since every single human has different 
way of doing things, different behavior, and different common sense. 
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Therefore we shall be aware when we using or describe the risk or the reliability of the system by 
probability or perform a quantitative analysis, due to the nature of uncertainties involved in the 
result. 
Once we get a final evaluated value of the event, we can then design for system improvement, 
more safe efficiency, and more reliable system if needed. Redundancy of the system may be 
added to create more reliable of the system if it give more effective and efficiency to the system. 
From paper OTC-7279
[13]
 have not mention anything regarding uncertainty in data. The numbers 
and values used in calculation are directly from probability (P) and probability given background 
knowledge (P(A|K)) that we can be found from different sources that stated in the paper. For 
example OREDA which is the same data source that I selected to use in this paper. However the 
paper has mention that the data in OREDA is already include the error which caused by human, 
again as I state above it is nearly impossible to assign a concrete probability value for human 
error since every single person has different behavior and way of make things done. 
From paper PSIG 0701
[14]
 said: 
“After the goals or undesired events have been defined and the 
data collected the analysis phase begins. The collected data is 
used to construct functional block diagrams for each system. A 
fault tree is then developed which will provide quantitative 
measures of risk and reliability.” 
 
It is not necessary to construct Function Block Diagram in prior to construct a fault tree. 
However both diagrams can easily convert into one another in order to provide information of 
the system in a different view. Fault tree diagram give a better illustrate of event(s) that can 
trigger the undesired event while Function Block Diagram give a great overview of system, the 
flow of the system. We may use Function Block Diagram that we already have to double check 
whether we have missed any component which may lead to the failure of the system or the 
undesired event while we conduct a Fault Tree Analysis. On the other hand once we have a Fault 
Tree, we can analyse what can be add in order to improve reliability of the system by adding 
necessary redundancy to the system.  
Reliability Block Diagram seems to be more profitable analysis that should be constructed in 
prior to Fault Tree analysis. It gives overview of the redundancy of the system, especially with 
cut-off approach. Cut-set analysis shows a combination of components that if they fail will cause 
the system failure and it can be convert as an example from Figure 6 Conversion of “OR” gate 
(FTA to RBD) and Figure 8 Conversion OF “and” GATE (FTA TO RBD). 
The second part of the paragraph said “A fault tree is then developed which will provide 
quantitative measures of risk and reliability”. As we discuss earlier in 3.2 that FTA can be 
conduct both quantitative and qualitative approach (see 3.2.1 Qualitative FTA and 3.2.2 
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Quantitative FTA). Fault tree can be used as Root Cause Analysis tool which does not need 
quantitative approach, qualitative will do the job well since the purpose of the analysis is to find 
what cause the failure.  
On the other hand, if you use Fault Tree as a tool that gives support information in decision 
making process then quantitative approach is a must. We then can compare all alternatives we 
have, decide whether the design is good enough or safe enough or lower than ALARP. Those 
analyses need probabilistic numbers to judge and decide for the best alternative or solution. The 
important thing is to keep in mind at all time that probability is an uncertain number and ensure 
that it has been taking care of, has been reduce to as small as possible, has done additional 
analyse and the system is designed for the flexible of the uncertain numbers.   
If the final frequency value or probability value is higher than the risk acceptance criteria, the 
system must be redesign. A redundancy of the system may be added and/or back-fitting for the 
operational system
[15]
 
In additionally, the integration of FTA with other analysis method such as Bayesian Network 
Analysis or Event Tree Analysis or convert to Reliability Block Diagram is possible and should 
be done. 
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Separator 
Overfilled
Excessive gas 
inside separator
Excessive liquid 
inside separator
Failure in relieft 
system
Fault signal from 
PC keep PV close
CV2 fail to open 
on demand
1 2
Excessive water 
inside separator
Excessive oil 
inside separator
CV3 fail to open 
on demand
CV4 fail to open 
on demand
LV fail to open on 
demand
Fault signal keep 
LV close
3 4 5 6
0.63 0.97 1.62 1.62 0.83 0.63
q=0.1045 q=0.1563 q=0.2471 q=0.2471 q=0.1353 q=0.1045
 
 
FIGURE 9 QUANTITATIVE FTA 
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3.2.3 Pros and Cons 
Pros Cons 
 
 Can evaluate complex system 
 Identify events that can cause “undesired 
event” 
 Identify root causes 
 Can use Boolean algebra or probability as 
additional analysis data 
 Top-down analysis 
 Can accommodate multi thread 
simultaneous  
 Great tool for investigate accident, 
incident or anomaly 
 Can accommodate human error in analyse 
 Graphical and easy to understand 
 Give a good overview of system’s 
redundancy 
 Possible for both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis 
 Provide a logical framework for 
understanding the ways in which a system 
can fail 
 
 
 Only include failure that cause the “top 
event” or “undesired event” 
 Do not concern about effect of the failure 
 Need to conduct analysis on each 
undesired event. It is time consuming if 
you have many events/failure that you 
need to analyse 
 Easily to overlook at human factor during 
analyse 
 Not able to analyse a degraded system 
(need to transform into reliability block 
diagram for future analysis) 
 Require product/component expert to do 
the analyse 
 Doesn’t consider uncertainties 
 
 
NB the data in the table above are from my own conclusion from many different papers and 
internet source I use. The two main sources are [16] and [17] 
3.2.4 Weaknesses and Strengths 
Weaknesses 
Uncertainty – Due to the nature of data that always has uncertainty, we all know that certainty 
can only be achieved under strong experimental conditions, not in the real world and probability 
is just a tool used to express the uncertainties
[11]
. Therefore we must take those into account and 
do not uses the final result as a final answer for any decision we make base on the analysis we 
have done. Sensitivity analysis may conduct in order to examines the effect that the uncertainty 
has on the results
[18] 
Yue-Lung Cheng did a research on Uncertainties in Fault Tree Analysis
[19]
 base on Guth’s 3-
value logic
[20]
. The theory has been taken False-Negatives and False-Positives into account and 
 Analytical Methods for Risk Assessment Page 31 
generate into 3-value logic form. Guth has developed his theory based on Dempster-Shafer thory 
which then again came from two ideas. First is to obtain degrees of belief for one question from 
subjective probabilities for a related question and second is for combining such degrees of belief 
when they are based on independent items of evidence
[21]
. Further study of the theory is needed 
if the analysis would like to adapt this theory to reduce the uncertainty in data. 
The theory and the idea of obtain an estimate probability from expert is great especially for an 
early phase of the project that involved in new technology and/or new hardware. But for a known 
project or a similar project as in the past, a combination or degree of belief from expert and 
history data seems to be less uncertain. Limbourg, Savic, Petersen and Kochs said in their paper 
that: 
“Expert estimates can be merged, added and updated in a 
comprehensible way. Because of the conservative uncertainty 
treatment inherently included in DST, results could be further 
utilized, even in a skeptical environment. Experts have the 
possibility to describe critical uncertainties by intervals 
without the need to justify a distribution assumption. 
Therefore the method is especially useful in reliability and 
safety prediction during the first design stages
 [22]”  
Another way to treat the uncertainty is to perform a traditional way of FTA and perform an 
additional analysis method such as Bayesians Network, Bayesians update and Sensitivity 
Analysis which we will discuss later in Chapter 4. Dealing with uncertainties. 
Do not concern about the effect of the failure – it only focus on what basic event could cause 
the failure, but does not give any information regarding the effect if those event actually occur 
either give any details how we should deal with those event. For further use, we can combine 
FTA and FMECA together. For example from the given example earlier in this chapter, once we 
analyse an undesired event by FTA and know that there is a possibility that the undesired event 
can occur. We then look into FMECA of those basic event in FTA such as “CV2 fail to open on 
demand”. In FMECA we have listed all the possible failure, the effect of the failure on the 
subsystem, the effect of the failure on the system function, failure rate, detection of failure, 
criticality, and corrective action or risk reducing measure. Those will answer the question…when 
event A occurred and what’s next? 
Easy to overlook at human factor during the analysis – even though FTA is an analysis that 
support and cover human error, but it is often forgotten during the analysis. All activities that 
need a human in contribution of an operation must be considered as a treat that can trigger the 
failure. Probability value can be estimated and given according to the frequency and the duration 
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that one must work with the system. But as we all know that it is nearly impossible to give a 
good estimate for such value due to a unique behavior, habit of persons. Therefore the system 
should design for prevention of error caused by human as much as possible. 
The human error can be reduced as minimum if we integrate proper risk reduction methods. 
There are many possible methods that can be integrated with the system to prevent human error, 
for example: 
 Procedures and guideline on each operation must be available and provided in prior to 
field work. Worker must follow the procedures to avoid any incident or accident to occur. 
The guideline should include corrective actions when an undesired event occurs. In this 
case we can link FTA with FMECA report for a corrective action if the system fail due to 
a component failure 
 All workers must pass a proper training session in prior to field work according to the 
responsibility he/she has to the system and the subsystem. Knowledge of the whole 
system is a plus, so that he/she will know the effect that can cause and what should it be 
done as he/she is part of the system itself 
 Establish barriers to prevent errors. A common barrier such as warning message when 
worker trying to commit a fault input to the system, or when the system doesn’t receive a 
proper input within the required period to a temporary barrier such as a barrier-rope to the 
area that a maintenance process is undergoing. Piper Alpha can give us a good example 
and lessons learn for human error 
 Introduce educate program for workers. Toolbox talk is an example for such program, 
that allow and introduce workers to the equipments, tools, procedure, what are the DO 
and DON’T during the operation 
 Good rotation and shift schedule should be established, due to human needs a good 
proportion of rest and relax and employer will get productivities in returned. A long 
working hours on the other hand gives tiresome and unproductive day for workers 
 Reduce the need of human interaction in the system as much as possible, to avoid the 
error that cause by human. For an AI system it is possible to maintain and reprogram if 
the system is malfunction and it can be track, while human has many different way to 
perform a simple job 
Not able to analyse a degrade system – in FTA system either fail or in function unless the 
undesired event in the analysis is given for example as fail when the system perform at 50%. A 
degrade system can be analyzed by transform FTA into a Reliability Block Diagram (won’t be 
discuss in this paper). In that way we can analyse when a system given degrade performance and 
the end result of the whole system when one or more component are not fully function 
Do not concern about the effect of the failure – due to the analysis is focus in what can trigger 
the failure but not the effect of the failure. In this case it is recommended that we combine FTA 
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with other analysis method such as FMECA which stated and show what the effect are and what 
recommended actions are when an incident occur 
Strengths 
Give a good overview of system’s redundancy – can simply identify system whether it is lack 
of redundancy or overly redundant. This tool will be useful when the designer want to design for 
a higher reliable system. Since the redundancy will give higher availability to the system if the 
sub-system fails, make the system run consistency, safer for the personnel and environment. On 
the other hand, if the system is designed overly redundant, both CAPEX and OPEX will strongly 
increase (higher maintenance cost, higher expenses in purchase those extra components for the 
redundancy part). Designer need to make a decision base on the final reliability value that 
calculated from FTA, compare with the system without redundancy part whether it is worth to 
invest or not.  
However, the different in two systems (with redundancy and without redundancy) give us two 
different final values, but nothing more. Who can decide whether 0.00009 differ in reliability 
give us a “green light” to start modify the system, when the effect in return maybe as small as 1 
PLL in 10 year man hours but the company must invest 10 billion for the modification? This is 
one of the main problem that we facing when it comes to the safety of personnel. 
No one can give a value of one life. Therefore it makes things more complicate when we would 
like to make a decision base on numbers only.  
Can accommodate human error in analysis – this is an advantage of FTA in compare with 
FMECA. FMECA will only consider the possible failure of components without regard to 
external environment which actually play a big factor in risk analysis. However, human error is 
random event, cannot be predicted and nearly impossible to assign a concrete value for such an 
error. Therefore we will have to come back and think about uncertainty in data when we would 
like to give a probability value to a failure that cause by human 
Provide an estimate time for maintenance purpose – Mean Time to Failure or Mean Time 
between Failures can be calculate and estimated by FTA. We can find information such as failure 
rate for each basic event, and MTTF is equal reciprocal of failure rate. Preventive maintenance is 
scheduled base on these values. 
  
 Analytical Methods for Risk Assessment Page 34 
3.3 Hazard and Operability 
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) is a qualitative analysis technique that identifies potential 
hazards in a system and identify operability problems likely to lead to nonconforming product. 
HAZOP is based on a theory that assumes risk events are caused by deviations from design or 
operating intentions
[23]
. It can be described by using sets of “Guide-words” as a systematic list of 
deviation perspectives and “process parameters” as indicator of input or output of the process. It 
carried out by HAZOP team which composed of expert from many disciplinary who has no 
responsibility for the process and/or the performance of the analyzed system to avoid any bias to 
the task. The team brainstorming and give their opinion and suggestion regarding the node or 
topic that has been set in agenda. 
The analyst examines plans, existing processes or operations in order to identify and evaluate 
problems that may represent risks to personnel, equipment, environment or prevent efficient 
operation
[24]
. Therefore the analysis should be doing when these document and information are 
available: 
 P&ID (Process and Instrumentation Diagram) 
 Process flow diagram 
 Layout diagrams 
 Material safety data sheets 
 Provisional operating instructions 
 Heat and material balances 
 Equipment data sheets Start-up and emergency shut-down procedures 
HAZOP is usually conducted during the design phase and construction period to ensure that 
recommendations, specifications and safety standard are met. Additionally for more efficiency 
and higher safety degree, HAZOP study can be conducted periodic and at every modification 
that affect the process to ensure that plant emergency and operation procedures are regularly 
reviewed and updated. 
“Guide-words” according to IEC standard 61882: 
“The identification of deviations from the design intent is 
achieved by a questioning process using predetermined 
“guide words”. The role of the guide word is to stimulate 
imaginative thinking, to focus the study and elicit ideas 
and discussing” 
The basic set of relevant “Guide-words” to the operation must be selected and used for descript 
the deviation perspective. Examples of Guide-words are: 
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TABLE 4 BASIC HAZOP GUIDE-WORDS[4] 
Guide-word Meaning Example 
No (not, none) None of the design intent is 
achieved 
No flow when production is 
expected 
More (more of, higher) Quantitative increase in a 
parameter 
Higher temperature than 
designed 
Less (less of, lower) Quantitative decrease in a 
parameter 
Lower pressure than normal 
As well as (more than) An additional activity occurs Other valves closed at the same 
time (logic fault or human error) 
Part of Only some of the design intention 
is achieved 
Only part of the system is shut 
down 
Reverse Logical opposite of the design 
intention occurs 
Back-flow when the system 
shuts down 
Other than (other) Complete substitution – another 
activity takes place 
Liquids in the gas piping 
 
Parameter are wording that descript input and output of the study node. Some example of 
parameters that can be found in oil and gas process facility and followed with an example: 
 Temperature – more temperature      temperature is higher than expected in design limit 
 Pressure – less pressure     pressure is lower than normal 
 Flow – no flow      blockage of the flowline 
 Separation – reverse separation   high volume (percentage) of hydrocarbon in water 
treatment system 
 Speed – less speed      velocity of hydrocarbon from manifold to process facility is lower 
than expected 
 Level – more level     high level of water drop in gas outlet 
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3.3.1 HAZOP procedure
[25]
 
1. Divide the operation process into study nodes. Define the scope of the node. We can 
separate the whole operation process into many small nodes by divide when a system 
undergoes a significant change. For example divided a separator system and a heat 
exchanger system into two nodes 
2. Select a node that we want to study/analyse. The process engineer and others in the team 
who have knowledge of the system will explain the purpose of the node and determine 
the process safe limits. The team then discusses general questions about the scope and 
intent of the design base on the design information that we have available such as P&ID 
3. Select relevant guide-words and parameter to the selected node. Determine the safety 
limit according to the design 
4. Identify hazards and their causes with help of the selected guide-words and parameter. 
Keep in mind that HAZOP analysis is based on the believe that hazards in operation are 
caused from deviation that greater than the range in designed system (safety limit from 
no.3) 
5. Identify and record causes and consequences (consequences to personnel, environment, 
economic) and suggest safeguard 
“Safeguard is facilities that help to reduce the occurrence 
frequency of the deviation or to mitigate its consequences. 
There are five types of safeguard: 
1. Identify the deviation 
2. Compensate for the deviation 
3. Prevent the deviation from occurring 
4. Prevent further escalation of the deviation 
5. Relieve the process from the hazardous deviation”[4] 
 
6. Repeat step 2 until all nodes analyzed 
Figure 10 shows the diagram of HAZOP procedure. We may adapt and include more information 
such as the frequency of the deviation and analyse it as quantitative analysis. However, the 
frequency data are only the predicted value which has uncertainty in its. 
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FIGURE 10 HAZOP PROCEDURE [25] 
 
3.3.2 Pros and Cons 
Pros Cons 
 Systematic examination[4] 
 The team approach to a HAZOP makes it a 
multidisciplinary study
[4]
 
 Utilizes operational experience[4] 
 The process covers safety as well as 
operational aspects
[4]
 
 Solutions to the problems identified may be 
indicated
[4]
 
 Considers operational procedures[4] 
 Covers human errors[4] 
 Study led by independent person[4] 
 Results are recorded[4] 
 Accuracy of drawings and data used as a basic 
for the study
[4]
 
 Time consuming[4] 
 Focusing too much on solutions[4] 
 Team members allowed to divert into 
endless discussions of details
[4]
 
 A few of the team members dominate 
the discussion
[4]
 
 The team may think system has “No 
problem” [4] 
 The team may think this is “Waste of 
time” [4] 
 Bias in team member “This is my 
design. This is my procedure and is 
the best.” 
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 Experienced and skilled HAZOP team[4] 
 Technical skills and insights of the team[4] 
 Easily learned and performed by the operation 
team member 
 Does not require considerable technical 
expertise for technique formulation 
 No mathematic or statistic involve which mean 
less uncertainty 
 Ability of the team to use the HAZOP 
approach as an aid to identify deviations, 
causes, and consequences
[4]
 
 Ability of the team to maintain a sense of 
proportion, especially when assessing the 
severity of the potential consequences.
 [4]
 
 Brainstorming approach 
 Cover all aspect from many different point of 
view of each profession 
 Can use as a review of instrument and process 
design 
 Hardly to be miss-analysis part of the system, 
since the analysis should follow from P&ID or 
other process diagram 
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3.3.3 Weaknesses and strengths 
Weaknesses 
Time consume – the discussion may endless if the team discuss in too detail on the topic or on a 
single guide-word. Team leader play the main role to control and try to keep discussion within 
the focus topic and cut the unnecessary small details. The meeting shouldn’t be longer than 2 
hours per session 
Discussion – the meeting will turn out useless if none of the team member dominates the idea 
during the discussion (everyone thought “no problem” or “the system is perfect”). As well as if 
only a few members dominate topics or idea regarding data in HAZOP report, the report and 
result of the meeting won’t be as effective as it should. HAZOP will reach the most effective 
when the entire members share their knowledge, bring out the possible thought regarding safety 
and the possible deviation that can occur during operational mode. On the other hand, if team 
members go too deep in some detail and forget the agenda of the meeting, the discussion will 
also be useless as well 
Bias – As the fact that human has bias. The team member may unfair in their decisions, they may 
get influenced by peoples and others opinions, rather than considering the facts. This will give a 
positive result for the analysis since the discussion may deviate from the actual system operation. 
Therefore, we should select a team member who has nothing to do with the system, not the 
designer, not the operator himself, not the project manager, not the electrical who work on the 
system, but someone that have knowledge and technical skill on those area and able to bring up 
some discussion regarding the system and hazard that may occur 
Strengths 
Cover human’s error – the possible deviations are considered and identify the possible causes 
which included the deviation that can cause by human error 
Brainstorming approach – great source of idea come from expert who has different 
backgrounds, independent and has no bias to the system. The team will speak out the possible 
deviation that can occur in the system base on the guide-words 
Cover most of the operational hazard – once the team follows the guide-words and do the loop 
until all the guide-words and parameter have been analyzed. This can be proven that all possible 
hazards are considered and recorded 
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4. Dealing with uncertainties 
The uncertainties are inherent in every activity. In everyday life we all facing uncertainty, we 
need to deal with it and make a decision. Things such as when we travel to somewhere we are 
“not sure” how to get there, we need to make a decision and take “chances”. If we do a good 
research, we will reach to the destination without getting lost. Else we may end up in somewhere 
we may don’t even know how to get home.  
The same logic is also applied in oil and gas industry. In exploration phase, we never know what 
is under the ground or the seabed. We will need to do the research and gathering information to 
reduce the uncertainty of drilling and hit a dry well – in that case we will lose a fortune. There 
are many methods, tools or processes that we can conduct to reduce the uncertainty and they are 
vary by the project lift cycle and also vary by the objective of the operation. 
During exploration phase to reduce the uncertainty of drill and hit a dry well, we may conduct a 
seismic study, coring a well, running a well-test analysis, consulting an expert, running logging 
surveys and learning from other fields, companies or peoples. 
During design and planning phase to reduce the uncertainty of incident that can occur during 
operational period, we may conduct analysis methods such as FMECA, FTA and HAZOP as 
they already described under chapter 3. Analytical methods.  
The questions are how can be combine those information with the observed data we already 
have, how much we willing to pay for such analysis and research, will the study assist us in 
decision making or change the decision, does the study worth its cost in compare with the 
reduction of the uncertainties.  
There are two methods that are widely used in dealing with uncertainties. First is Bayesian 
Networks and secondly is Sensitivity analysis. 
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4.1 Bayesian networks 
In the early way of calculate and estimate the probability is only base on past information data 
which has uncertainty in the value or “objective probability”. 
“Objective Probability or “Frequentist probability” is the 
probability that an event will occur based an analysis of the 
data from a large number of trials under the same condition, in 
which each measure is based on a recoded observation, rather 
than a subjective estimate.” 
Sometime the same condition or the experimental cannot be repeated or perform an objective 
probability, therefore a “subjective probability” can give us a probability of the event to occur 
base on someone’s “degree of belief”. 
 “Subjective Probability a probability derived from an 
individual’s personal judgment about how likely a particular 
event is to occur or “degree of belief”. It is not based on any 
precise computation but is often a reasonable assessment by a 
knowledgeable person and from his/her past experience”[26] 
An example for subjective probability is a football commentator expert saying that Viking will 
defeat to Haugesund 1-0 before the game is actually started (if it already start it will turn from 
probability into fact). Means the commentator express “his degree of belief” based on his own 
experience of watching the game, knows the player, knows the tactic of the opinion, knows the 
manager and knows the factors of how to win the game. However others commentators may 
express their degree of beliefs in contrast depending on their individual states of knowledge. On 
the other hand, Viking and Haugesund play against each other in many matches in the past. 
Frequentist probability analyse will collect those data and calculate based on the past information 
of repeated game under the similar condition. However in this case it is hard since the teams may 
change the players, change the tactics, change the manager etc. Therefore there must be another 
way to combine these two types of probability to fix other weaknesses. 
Another useful example of Subjective probability is when the repetition of the experiments is not 
possible. Objective probability is not possible to measure. The probability that we get in 
traditional way is Frequentist probability or Objective probability required a large number of 
trials that conduct under the same conditions and recorded the observe result then enter into 
statistic module in order to get probability of the event. An example of such case is Mr. A being 
hit by a car at the age of 30.  
Bayesian networks allowed systematic way of combining knowledge – prior information – and 
data in order to eliminate those uncertainties from objective probability and update probabilities 
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A B 
C 
when new evidence, new data – prior data – or new information becomes available. Prior 
information is the information that can obtain from expert judgment, technical knowledge, 
producer information, and data from similar cases in the past.  
It is present in probability graphical model – Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) – that shows the 
relationship between nodes and can be explained as the node which origin the arc is the “parent 
node” and the node where the arc is end is the “child node” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From Figure 11 nodes A and B represent “parent node” of node C “child node”. It represents 
knowledge about an uncertain domain. Each node in the graph represents a random variable, 
while the edges between the nodes represent probabilistic dependencies among the 
corresponding random variables
[27]
. 
The diagram can be drawn backward (of arrow). We know the actual problem and list down 
what can cause the problem. The arc is point from parent node toward child node represent the 
possibility that the parent can cause what in child. 
From the case study in this paper – separator overfills – we have analyzed the possible of 
component failure which can trigger the undesired event to occur by perform Fault Tree 
Analysis. After the analyst and system designer has study deeper into other possibility that could 
cause the undesired event, they found out that flow behavior can also be one of the reason that 
can cause overfill in the separator tank.  
Slugging is one of the common problems in flow assurance for multiphase flow – simultaneous 
flow of gas and liquid – occurs in almost every aspect of the oil industry. Multiphase flow is 
present in the wellbore, flowlines and topsides processing facilities such as separator. Slug flow 
involves the intermittent production of liquid slugs and gas bubbles, some of which can be 
hundreds of meters long, and can lead to severe fluctuations in pressures and flow-rates 
throughout the production system if not properly predicted and managed
[28]
.  
Riser-based slugging is associated with the pipeline risers. Liquids accumulate at the bottom of 
the riser until sufficient pressure is generated behind it to push the liquids head over the top of 
FIGURE 11 BASIC BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
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the riser, overcoming the static head. Behind this slug of liquid follows a slug of gas, until 
sufficient liquids have accumulated at the bottom to form a new liquid slug
[28]
. 
In this case study, we assumed that the expert studied and analyzed the flow behavior, and give a 
probability base on his degree of believe – subjective probability – that slugging will occur 24 
slugs/hour
[29]
 if no slug reduction mechanism has been installed or no proper predict and manage 
has been done. Those slug can cause overfill in the separator when a high volume of liquid slug 
filled up the tank. The results are poor separate result between gas and liquid hydrocarbon, 
equipment damage, unwanted flaring and etc. 
Assumed that in one hour, 2 of 24 times riser-based slugging will cause overfilled in the 
separator and 1 out of 5 times that separator is not overfilled facing slug problem. Show in Table 
5, Table 6 and Table 7 below.  
TABLE 5 NUMBERS OF OBSERVATION 
Overfilled 
Slugging 
Total 
Yes No 
Yes 3 4 7 
No 20 2 22 
Total 23 6 29 
 
TABLE 6 JOINT AND MARGINAL PROBABILITIES 
Overfilled 
Slugging 
Total 
Yes No 
Yes 0.10 0.14 0.24 
No 0.69 0.07 0.76 
Total 0.79 0.21 1 
 
TABLE 7 CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES FOR OVERFLOW AND SLUG 
Overfilled 
Slugging 
Total 
Yes No 
Yes 0.43 0.57 1.0000 
No 0.91 0.09 1.0000 
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This is new information we obtained from a future study. Bayesian’s formula enables and allows 
us to merge new information with the know data by following Bayesian’s formula - Bayes’ 
theorem is named after Thomas Bayes (1701-1761) who was an English Mathematician and 
Presbyterian minister. He never published what he found about this theorem himself, but the 
Bayes’ theorem were edited and published after his death by Richard Price - Bayes’ theorem: 
       
          
    
 
The theorem means probability of A given B as a condition of event A to happen. This theorem 
provides and explicit relation for the degree of belief accorded a hypothesis A, in light of 
evidence B. 
From our case study, given S represent slugging and O represent overfilled. We wanted to find 
out the probability that the separator tank is overflow due to riser-base slugging or        
       
          
    
 
 
         
    
 
      
It means 13% of separator overfill can caused by slugging in another 87% is caused by the 
internal mechanism of the separator. However, the designer can reduce the total probability of 
separator overfill by reduce overfill that cause by slugging and overfill that cause by internal 
mechanism. To reduce P(O|S) we can add one more control choke valve or CV1 (See Figure 13 
Separator process and instrumentation diagram) which open and close according to anti-slug 
algorithm – installed sensors along pipeline and interpret to control the choke valve. 
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4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
The decision or the final probabilities we get are based on the assumptions we made particularly 
with respect to uncertain quantities and variables over which we have choice. Sensitivity analysis 
showing how the numerical values depend on the assumptions made. It analyse under the idea of 
questions like “How accurately do we need to know these inputs?” “What extent the final 
decision is sensitive to changes in the inputs”. 
Steps to perform sensitivity analysis: 
1. Select the input variable 
2. Change the input variable one at the time. Changes of plus and minus 10% are often used 
3. Recalculate probability after change input variable 
4. A graph like tornado chart, spider chart or spider diagram can be used to illustrate the 
sensitivity of the input variable 
From our case study, we found that 13% of separator overfilled can cause by slug under the 
assumption from observation we had that there are 24 slugs per hour. Again, we are still 
uncertain that there could be more or less than 3 out of 23 slugs that could cause the overfilled 
(since the size of slug is not stable, some are large and some are small) or there could be more 
than 24 slugs per hour or less. The changing of variable such as the number of slug we found in 
observation will affect the final probability value. 
TABLE 8 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Number of slug that cause overfill 
(out of 23 observed slug) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
0 0.0435 0.087 0.13 0.174 0.217 0.26 
  
Since the number of slug that cause overfills is our input variable, is the one that contain 
uncertainty. We would like to perform the sensitivity analysis and see how the input variable can 
change the final probability. We will change from 0 to 6 (both plus and minus size from the 
original observed number). We then get the result in Table 8. 
We can see that if the number of slug that cause separator overfill increased from 3 to 6 times out 
of 23 observed slug, will give 200% higher probability. That’s mean the input value is very 
sensitive. We must look very careful when using this variable, when make any decision based on 
the information that calculated from this variable, to reduce the uncertainty or to implement a 
flexible solution to respond the outcomes of uncertain events. 
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Similar to the final probability with 90% interval that the separator is overfilled due to the failure 
of component(s) are between [0.037, 0.9843]. We can perform sensitivity analysis by change the 
failure rate on one of the component, such as “CV3 fail to open on demand” from 1.62 per 106 
hours into 2.4 per 10
6
 hours. Will the final probability that the undesired event to occur is still 
within the 90% interval? Can we ensure or confirm that 90% interval is good enough to represent 
the risk of the undesired event?  
The case study I use in this paper may not look that it can cause a serious side effect or given a 
large consequences. Let’s look at another example like the decision we need to make on firewall. 
The firewalls are designed according to the design load and normally vary between section to 
section on the module. When an incident such as fire occur, the firewall provide module 
occupants time before the fire start to spread or cross from one section to another, occupants time 
to escape and firefighters a chance to save the module, offer a safe means of evacuation of a 
distressed module, . The resistant time is depending on the wall thickness and the design of the 
wall. For example 4 inches thickness firewall can tolerate 45 min fire rated, or 6 inches thickness 
wall can withstand 2 hours fire rated. However, we should design for a flexible and unexpected 
incident. After fire ignited, it may follow with a blast. Therefore, it is wise to perform the 
sensitivity analysis as a cross checking or double check the decision had made. Size of the fire, 
size of the module, size of the blast, pressure of the blast can be our input variable in the analysis 
when you analyse for PLL or AIR. We may compare all alternative we have with regard to 
expenses, value of the selection in return (how many more life can be safe from a different 
design), how likely the event going to happen and etc. 
For a large and complex system, we may use computer software that have available in the market 
or create it in an excel sheet. A multiple change of input variables can be done at the time, but 
most were performed using an OAT (one-factor-at-a-time) approach. Each factor is perturbed in 
turn while keeping all other factors fixed at their nominal value. According to “Sensitivity 
Analysis Practices - Strategies for model-based inference” paper it is not wise to use OAT 
approach unless the model under analysis is proved to be linear
[30]
. 
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5. Conclusion 
Each analysis method provided information that assists in decision making regarding with design 
of the objective system (system in which we study). However a combination of method is a must 
in order to cover all aspect and in order to get all useful information needed to support decision 
making. FMECA give you an overview of all components in the system you analyzing, list of 
possible failure mode including suggest action when something go wrong with those component. 
FTA provided an easy illustration of what can cause an undesired event to occur and the 
probability of the event. All the possible hazard is listed by conducting HAZOP based on believe 
that hazard is caused by deviation from the design limit.  
However, the information used during analysis is uncertain. Some based on history data, some 
based on repeated experimental are some are given from various source. Therefore Bayesian 
networks and Sensitivity analysis are there to reduce the uncertain of those analyzed data. 
Bayesian networks allow us to combine subjective probability with objective probability, expert 
knowledge with experimented data, new information with information you had from before, 
while Sensitivity analysis is to verify how sensitive the input parameter are to the analyzed data. 
Figure 12 show procedure diagram using in this paper. 
In case the uncertain event occur, it would give big effect or big different from what we had 
analyzed. We must learn and know what uncertain information/data are and try to reduce or 
minimize it as much as possible. Since we cannot avoid the uncertain in data, therefore we must 
implement a flexible solution to respond the outcomes of uncertain events. 
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FIGURE 12 RISK ANALYSIS PROCEDURE USING IN THIS PAPER 
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FIGURE 13 SEPARATOR PROCESS AND INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAM 
